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Financial turmoil began in the summer of 2007 and has continued for some time. It was 
no more than a conjecture at the time of the JIMF Global Finance conference in March 2009 that 
it was over, in the sense that developments merely will be reasonably predictable consequences 
of prior events. As of this writing in July 2009, it still is a conjecture, even if a more plausible 
one. The turmoil progressed through several phases and affected nearly every global asset 
market. In this paper we present an overview of fixed-income markets during the turmoil and the 
crisis in September and October 2008. We are not attempting a final summary. Most particularly, 
we do not examine the relative importance of illiquidity and credit losses for the declines in 
securities prices. 
In this paper, we summarize the development of the turmoil and provide some 
institutional detail on important events.
1 The paper includes:  
1) a conceptual analysis of the drivers of the financial contagion including heterogeneity 
in subprime collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) plus a lack of transparency resulting 
in counterparty risk in these securities;  
2) a look at the structure of CDOs and the ABX index including the role of falling house 
prices in the run up to the turmoil;  
3) a summary of events and markets affected between August 9, 2007 and the middle of 
2009;  
                                                 
1 Our analysis has more in common with Gorton (2008) than Gorton (2009). For reasons evident 
in the paper, we think the events are better characterized as financial turmoil in 2007 and 2008 
followed by a financial crisis in September and October 2008 rather than “the panic of 2007”. 
Developments in 2007 were a prelude to the main event in 2008. The events in 2008 are a 
financial crisis even in the relatively restrictive terminology favored by Anna Schwartz (1986).   2
4) an analysis of the funding crisis in the fall of 2008 and the roles of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, the AIG resolution and money market mutual funds;  
5) a discussion of the evolution of government policy throughout the crisis.  
   
Contagion: It’s a Small World After All 
Figure 1 shows the behavior of housing prices in the United States from January 2000 through 
March 2009. While these two indexes of housing prices show different increases and decreases 
due to differences in coverage and methodology, the overall picture is the same: increases in 
housing prices until Summer 2006 or Spring 2007 followed by decreases.
2 This fall in housing 
prices occurred in the context of rising and then falling housing prices in many other parts of the 
world. 
The fall in housing prices in the U.S. had widespread effects on assets markets through a 
particular class of mortgage, subprime residential mortgages.
3 Subprime mortgages are 
mortgages made to borrowers who are less creditworthy than prime borrowers. 
While small relative to worldwide markets, this part of the mortgage market had 
widespread effects on financial institutions in the U.S. and around the world. Figure 2 shows that 
securitized U.S. subprime mortgages are small relative to financial markets around the world. 
Only about $1 billion in late 2006, securities based on subprime mortgages are less than one 
percent of our rough and probably incomplete estimate of $138 trillion in assets traded in 
securities markets around the world. 
                                                 
2  The Case-Shiller index is an index of housing prices in 20 metropolitan regions. The OFHEO 
index is an index of housing prices in the U.S. using mortgages purchased or securitized by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 
3  There is no precise agreed-upon definition of these mortgages. The general definition of a 
subprime mortgage is a mortgage to an owner-occupier of a house with more credit risk than a 
prime mortgage. This definition obviously is circular.   3
How did problems in this tiny market spread to all other asset categories represented, 
from corporate bonds and government debt to global equities and bank deposits? In this section, 
we present a summary analysis of the contagion, drawing a conceptual path of the important 
dynamics. 
  Perhaps the first feature to note is that U.S. subprime mortgage assets were 
overwhelmingly securitized, especially during the rapid expansion after 2003.  Originating 
mortgages to distribute them spread the risk of default among market participants. When 
originators of mortgages held mortgages until their payoff, the risk of default was concentrated 
in the originator. With securitization of the mortgages, any losses in value due to rising 
delinquency and foreclosure rates would be borne across investor groups around the world 
including hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds and individual investors. In and of 
itself, this diversification of risk is a positive development because risk is diversified and not 
concentrated. It also can reduce systemic risk. Systemic risk often implicitly focuses on a 
concentration of risks within one large, interconnected institution, an entity that cannot be 
quickly and easily resolved should it fail. The spreading of risk might have been thought to 
reduce the systemic risk posed by losses on subprime loans, because no one institution would 
sustain much loss on this relatively small class of assets. The events of the last two years indicate 
that this is an overly simplistic and ultimately misleading way to think about systemic risk. But 
why didn’t the diversification of risk help mitigate systemic risk, and could it have actually 
enhanced it? 
  The securitization of mortgages was only the first step in the financial engineering of 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). RMBS then were packaged into collateralized   4
debt obligations (CDOs).
4 The slicing and dicing of risk achieved via a CDO spread risk even 
further. The first payment tranche of a CDO was engineered to earn a AAA rating from a 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) and hence to become part of 
the investable universe for institutions with credit quality constraints on their portfolios 
(insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.). As the next section details, however, CDOs are far 
from homogeneous securities, both in terms of the underlying RMBS and the contractual 
structure of the CDO itself. The result was the proliferation of highly individualized CDO 
securities spread out among a global market of investors. 
The heterogeneity of CDOs then led directly to opacity in security valuation. The value 
of a particular CDO security can be modeled in a variety of ways, but all models rely on 
knowledge of the implications of the entire CDO’s structure plus knowledge or assumptions 
about the characteristics of the underlying RMBS and their underlying mortgages.
5 
Reliance on ratings of CDOs seemed an efficient form of informational intermediation in 
this market, at least until subprime mortgages began experiencing higher delinquency and default 
rates than predicted. This translated into losses in junior CDO tranches and called into question 
the probability of losses on higher-rated tranches. Left without confidence in the securities’ 
ratings, financial institutions began finding it difficult to value both their own securities and 
those for sale in the market. In addition to creating a challenge for risk management within 
institutions and a general lack of liquidity for these securities, the opacity also contributed to 
concerns about exposure to counterparty risk. 
                                                 
4  These are CDOs of asset-backed securities, which are distinguishable from CDOs of other 
assets such as corporate bonds. Our analysis focuses on CDOs of subprime-mortgage-backed 
securities. Apparent issues with these CDOs do not necessarily apply to other CDOs. 
5 Characteristics of mortgages that generally matter are the creditworthiness of borrowers and the 
loan-to-value ratio. More recently, the geographic location of the house used as collateral 
matters.   5
Financial institutions interact in a variety of different markets and engage in all sorts of 
transactions and arrangements, many of which involve exposure to counterparty risk. A simple 
example is unsecured lending by commercial paper, but these transactions also include repo 
activity, credit default swap trading, interbank lending, the provision of liquidity backstops, and 
many others.  Since CDOs are not standardized and trade in the OTC market, the exposure of 
any counterparty to CDOs in general was largely unobservable (except by general “common 
knowledge”). This opacity combined with the difficulty in assessing the value and risk of any 
particular CDO holdings increases the level of counterparty risk in these transactions.  
In a world in which the identity of trading parties matters and counterparty as well as 
other risks have increased, it is not particularly surprising to find that liquidity suffers as well. 
When the ratings of CDOs came into question, trading in these securities declined substantially. 
This decrease in trading was not confined to the mortgage-backed CDO market and spilled over 
into other asset markets and into funding markets. For example, the market for asset-backed 
student loans was affected. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) present an interesting model of such a connection 
between market liquidity and funding liquidity, highlighting the role of speculators’ capital 
constraints. In another paper, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) consider the spillovers of risk 
across financial institutions when some institutions are in distress. We see evidence of such 
complex interconnectedness in the recent period, but the professional literature is just beginning 
to develop research to flesh out the propagation mechanisms by which liquidity, counterparty 
risk, and opacity feed back into each other and drive systemic risk. 
At some point it seems, financial markets tipped from attempting to manage risk into a 
struggle to operate under uncertainty and this, perhaps, has made all the difference in how the 
financial crisis evolved. The distinction between risk and uncertainty is due to Frank Knight 
(1921) who stated that “a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we shall use the term, is so   6
far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.” The contrast 
between measurable, manageable risks and the world of unforeseen contingencies is understood 
by non-academics as well. In the words of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2002):  
… as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the 
ones we don't know we don't know.   
  How do market participants respond to conditions of uncertainty with many unknown 
unknowns? When the uncertainty relates to market interactions, one response is to withdraw 
from those interactions and reduce exposure to the uncertainty. The quest for safety can be seen 
as an amplification of standard responses to an increase in risk aversion. In terms of financial 
markets this translates into a “flight to quality” in which capital flows to the safest assets, for 
example U.S. Treasuries, and investments out of relatively risk free assets are delayed, 
sometimes described as capital being “on the sidelines”.  Since August 2007, we observed this 
phenomena in widening risk premia (especially in markets which historically have had little 
fundamental risk such as interbank lending), markedly decreased trading in markets involving 
counterparty risk exposure, and the virtual shutdown of the issuance of new securities. 
Finally, the uncertainty spread to “Main Street” investors as equity market participants 
took full account of the opacity regarding the financial condition of major institutions and the 
rapidity with which an institution could find itself unable to continue operations. For example, 
prior to March 2008, the problems at Bear Stearns were well known. Bear had closed 2 hedge 
funds in early Summer 2007 due to heavy subprime losses; its CEO, Jimmy Cayne, had stepped 
down in January 2008 after the firm experienced an $800 million loss in the fourth quarter of 
2007; and it had been reported for months that the firm was a takeover candidate (Moyer 2008).  
  The next sections of the paper outline three periods in the evolving financial turbulence:   7
the initial events related to the deterioration of the subprime market, the ensuing financial 
turmoil that spilled over into other markets and across institutions, and the precipitous financial 
crisis following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in fall 2008. The first period, which we can 
call the “Prelude”, ran from early 2007 or before to August 9, 2007. The second period, the 
“Main Act” ran from August 9, 2007 to September 16, 2008. The climax ran from September 16, 
2008 to some time early in 2009. The final, fourth period, the “Denouement,” is not covered in 
this paper in any detail, but the effects of the crisis continue. The last section of the paper returns 
to the conceptual discussion to discuss in broad terms the various policy responses and how they 
relate to the underlying drivers of heterogeneity, opacity, counterparty risk and uncertainty. 
 
Prelude 
Figure 3 shows mortgage originations by type in the U.S. from 2001 through 2007. Total 
mortgage origination peaked in 2003 and the composition of originations changed substantially 
with prime mortgages declining in importance and subprime and alt-A mortgages increasing in 
importance along with home-equity lines of credit. 
Some put this increase in subprime lending at the doorstep of the creation of 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which may be partly correct. It is important to note that 
two government-sponsored enterprises – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – became substantial 
buyers of subprime and alt-A mortgages at the same time, thereby also increasing the demand for 
these mortgages (Wallison and Calomiris 2008). 
Collateralized Debt Obligations 
As the previous section mentioned, and as this section will outline, heterogeneity both of 
the underlying mortgages and also the specifics of CDO’s security tranching create a lack of 
standardization in these instruments and contribute to opacity. This leads directly to the difficulty 
of valuing such securities.   8
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are securities based on pools of securities. While 
these underlying pools of securities can be leveraged loans or corporate bonds, we focus the 
discussion on CDOs made up of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) 
because it was the deteriorating value of these securities that triggered the financial turmoil. 
A CDO is a legal structure that permits the structuring of risk exposures from the 
RMBSs. Suppose that the RMBSs in the pool have a credit rating of BBB.
6 By legal 
subordination, it is possible to take the payoffs from these BBB-rated securities and create a set 
of securities, called tranches, which can have ratings from AAA to BBB- and a remaining piece 
that is below investment grade, which is called the equity tranche. At its most basic, the tranches 
are created by a waterfall of the payments from the underlying securities. In this waterfall, the 
AAA tranche is paid first, the AA tranche is paid second, and so forth with the equity tranche 
paid last. If there are insufficient funds to pay a tranche its promised payment, then tranches 
lower down the waterfall get nothing. Interpreted in inverse order, the equity tranche is the first-
loss tranche, the BBB- is the second-loss tranche, etc. Commonly, the AAA tranche comprises 
on the order of 80 to 85 percent of the total value of the securities. 
CDOs are idiosyncratic securities, with differing terms across deals. The actual non-
standardized structure of a CDO is noticeably more complicated than the simple example in the 
last paragraph. For example, some of the loans in an RMBS will be paid off early and CDOs can 
differ in how they allocate these prepayments. The allocation rule is important because the risk 
of prepayment is borne by the tranche which is paid first, but that tranche bears less risk of non-
payment of principal in later years.
7 CDOs can also have various embedded options which affect 
                                                 
6 The term CDO often is used to mean two different things: 1. A security created by structuring; 
and 2. The trust formed to hold the securities and manage the cash flows. We will use the term 
“special purpose vehicle” to describe the trust created to hold the securities. 
7 For subprime mortgages, the best credits commonly prepay at the end of the first couple of 
years because the mortgage is refinanced into a prime mortgage.   9
their structure and payouts. For example, some CDOs have options for the equity tranche to 
dissolve the special purpose vehicle. Dissolution can be profitable when the CDO’s value is 
greater than the value of the underlying securities.
8 
The characteristics of the securities underlying a particular CDO are specified in the trust 
agreement which sets up the special purpose vehicle that owns the underlying securities. For 
example, agreements commonly specify the average credit rating of the mortgages, the average 
loan-to-value ratio and similar loan-based characteristics. Often, these characteristics are 
specified in the prospectus for the deal and much of the funds for the securities are committed 
before the underlying mortgages are acquired. 
CDOs can differ in more ways. CDOs can be based on passive trusts or they can be 
managed. Synthetic CDOs can hold no underlying RMBS securities, instead using credit default 
swaps to replicate the cash flows from the securities. Furthermore, some tranches of CDOs have 
been used as the underlying securities in yet other CDOs, termed CDOs-squared.
9 
CDOs are traded over the counter, not on any organized exchange. Given their 
idiosyncrasies, it is not obvious that trading in any particular deal would be sufficient for an 
exchange to provide more liquidity than an over-the-counter market. In response to demand for a 
tradable instrument that represents the market for subprime CDOs more generally, the ABX 
index was created. 
The ABX index is a readily available measure of the value of CDOs from the vendor 
Markit. It is an index based on a basket of CDOs of underlying subprime mortgages. The ABX 
trades on the basis of the index value, which is commonly and misleadingly called the “price”.
 10 
                                                 
8  Such dissolutions are not so common in the last couple of years. 
9 Whetten (2005) provides a very nice summary of these complex instruments and their payoff 
characteristics. It is interesting that these instruments originated in Europe. 
10 No one pays the “price.” In fact, trades based on the ABX are trades of related credit default 
swaps and there is an embedded loan for 100 minus the “price” which changes hands on 
execution of a trade.   10
The ABX is not invariant over time but is created from vintages of mortgages. At 
initiation, the ABX index is an equally-weighted index based on twenty deals in the prior six 
months. For example, the January 2006 index started as an equally-weighted index of 20 of the 
largest sub-prime home equity ABS programs from July through December 2005. To help make 
the index representative of the universe of deals, the index includes no more than four deals from 
the same loan originator and no more than six deals from the same master servicer. 
The initial deals must have reference obligations in each of the ratings categories, AAA, 
AA, A, BBB and BBB- and the deals’ tranches themselves must be rated by both Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s, with the lower of the two ratings applying. In addition, to be included, at 
least 90 percent of the underlying mortgages must be first-lien mortgages and the weighted-
average FICO score must not be less than 660. Each tranche has a weighted average life between 
four and six years on issuance, except the AAA tranche which has a weighted average life 
greater than 5 years. Finally, the tranches bear interest at a floating rate based on LIBOR.
11 
Emerging Difficulties in Subprime Loans  
Figure 4 shows the values of the ABX indices from the start of trading through March 23, 
2009.
12 Index values are determined by Markit based on quotes from dealers since the 
underlying securities are traded over the counter. The vintages issued to date are those for 2006 
and 2007 because there have not been enough qualifying deals to issue an index since. Values of 
all of the vintages have decreased. Furthermore, the more recent vintages have decreased more. 
This is so even though the later vintages carry higher coupon rates, “fixed rates” in terms of the 
underlying credit default swaps. The BBB and BBB- tranches of the ABX 07-2 vintage started 
trading below the par value of 100, which is not particularly surprising; their fixed rates were set 
                                                 
11  Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin (2009) provide detail on how the ABX trades. 
12 CDOs generally have more than one AAA tranche. There is an additional index for the 
penultimate AAA tranche of the AAA tranches of all vintages which was introduced in May 
2008.  CDOs can have additional tranches.   11
at the maximum of 500 basis points. 
                                                
The tranches of the 2006 vintage, denoted 06-1, traded initially at the par value of 100 
and even above par. In fact, all tranches of the 06-1 vintage traded above 100 for the entire year 
of 2006 except for the BBB- tranche, which traded below 100 for 10 days, and the BBB tranche, 
which traded below 100 for one day. The second 2006 tranche, denoted 06-2, traded lower by the 
end of 2006, but not by amounts that seriously forewarned of extraordinary future problems. At 
the close of trading in 2006, all of the tranches of the 06-1 vintage were trading above 100 and 
the tranches of the 06-2 vintage were trading at 99.27 for the AAAs, 100.09 for the AAs and As, 
96.5 for the BBBs and 95.25 for the BBB-s.
13 
In 2007, the prices in the market started falling shortly after the start of the year. The 06-2 
vintage traded at 92.28, 98.44,99.38, 75.52 and 66.23 by the end of February.
14 The 07-1 vintage 
which started trading on January 19, 2007 at 100.01, 100.04, 100.03, 98.35 and 97.47 was at 
92.00, 99.19, 99.38, 70.50 and 64.46 by the end of February. It is interesting to note that prices 
fell well before any common dating of the subsequent financial turmoil. It also is evident in 
Figure 4 that later vintages fell more than earlier ones for all the ratings.
15 
There are at least two likely explanations for these falls. First, the quality of work at 
origination may have fallen as some have alleged. Second, the subprime mortgages backing 
these securities may have been adversely affected by the fall in housing prices. This explanation 
is particularly cogent because these mortgages were at least sometimes used by borrowers to get 
a prime mortgage later contingent on continued appreciation, or at least no depreciation, in 
 
13 From this point on, we simply quote index values as a set of five values, going from highest 
rating to lowest. 
14 It may seem odd that a lower rating can have a higher index value than a higher rating, but 
recall that the index value is based on a fixed rate that is lower for the higher index value. Hence, 
the change in price reflects information about losses relative to the time of initial creation of the 
CDO. 
15  This is so even though the later vintages had higher fixed rates, or roughly speaking, coupons.   12
housing prices. The underlying subprime loans often had a structure in which the initial rate for 
subprime mortgages was adjustable and well above the rates for prime mortgages. This 
adjustable rate was fixed for the first two or three years and there was a prepayment penalty for 
refinancing the mortgage during that period. At the end of this period, the adjustable rate would 
adjust, generally upwards and by a substantial amount. These provisions are consistent with a 
particular borrowing strategy. After receiving a subprime loan, a borrower’s credit rating would 
improve if house payments were made on time. In addition, if housing prices went up, the 
borrower’s equity in the house would increase. At the end of two years, the subprime borrower 
could refinance out of the subprime mortgage and into a lower-rate prime mortgage, possibly 
with a second mortgage if the house price did not rise 25 percent or more. 
This strategy for refinancing at the end of two years could run into trouble in various 
ways, and in particular, the realization of falling house prices would make it impossible to 
refinance without adding funds from outside to pay off the principal that represented a loss in the 
house’s value. This is an improbable solution for many subprime borrowers whose low credit 
ratings go hand in hand with little in the way of assets.  
Housing prices peaked in July 2006 according to the Case-Shiller index and in April 2007 
according to the OFHEO index. This timing is consistent with decreases in the ABX indexes in 
2007 foreshadowing the trouble brewing for the underlying subprime loans. Falling house prices 
spelled more trouble for more recent subprime loans, which did not have a cushion of equity 
based on the prior rise in price. As Figure 4 shows, the prices of the later indices fell more, and 
substantially more for the higher rated tranches.  Even though there is no organized trading in 
CDOs, the problems were becoming evident. The decline in ABX index values certainly 
suggested problems with the underlying securities and loans. 
The problems also surfaced in the business for subprime lenders, indicating problems 
with some recently issued mortgages. Mortgage delinquencies on subprime mortgages were   13
increasing. A common provision in securitization agreements is an option for the purchaser to 
sell the mortgage back to the originator if payment problems arise within a set time after issuance 
(the warrantees mentioned earlier). Ownit Mortgage filed for bankruptcy on January 2, 2007 
because it did not have the funds to repurchase subprime mortgages which it was obligated to 
repurchase. (Keoun, 2007). In addition to this bankruptcy filing, subprime lenders MLN, 
ResMae, People’s Choice and New Century Financial filed for Chapter 11 before the middle of 
the year while South Star, another subprime lender, filed for Chapter 7. 
 
Financial Turmoil 
At first called the “subprime mess” or “subprime meltdown”, problems started to become 
evident on Wall Street and London in June 2007. Two Bear Sterns’ highly leveraged mortgage-
backed securities funds lost virtually all their value and ultimately filed for bankruptcy due to 
decreases in the prices of AAA and AA mortgage-backed securities. On June 25, London-based 
Cheyne Capital Management LLP announced it was writing off 400 million euros from a hedge 
fund that had investments in subprime-mortgage-backed securities. (England 2007.)
16 
August 9, 2007 is the commonly used date for the start of the financial turmoil. On that 
date, the largest bank in France, BNP Paribas SA, froze redemptions from three funds with 
investments in U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities rated AAA and AA. On that same 
date, the European Central Bank (ECB) loaned a total of nearly 95 billion euros, the most it had 
ever provided, to 49 firms; the Federal Reserve increased its lending of reserves for 14-day terms 
and the Bank of Canada added an extraordinary amount of reserves (Zhou, 2007). 
The problems were evident in, or perhaps spread to, financial markets. Figure 5 shows 
the 30-day London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the overnight indexed swap rate (OIS) 
                                                 
16 The same fund reported difficulties in 2008 due to payment problems with “so-called non-
conforming mortgages” in the U.K. (Unmack 2008).   14
for dollar loans.
17 LIBOR is the inter-quartile average of rates at which each bank in a panel of 
banks “could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in 
reasonable market size” (British Bankers Association, 2002).
18 The 30-day overnight indexed 
swap rate is the fixed rate on an interest rate swap of fixed for floating over the next 30 days. 
From January 2, 2002 to August 9, 2007, the spread between LIBOR and OIS never exceeded 36 
basis points and averaged only 9 basis points.
19 On August 9, LIBOR rose nine basis points and 
OIS fell by nine basis points. The spread continued to widen in following days, reaching a local 
peak of 63 basis points on August 16 and a higher peak of 95 basis points on September 9, 2007. 
These higher rates for LIBOR relative to Treasury bills are not just an issue for some 
banks in the U.K. or Europe. Derivative contracts typically have payments and prices set off 
LIBOR and, in fact, many subprime mortgages in the U.S. have adjustable rates based on 
LIBOR. 
While undoubtedly there were counterparty concerns about lending to firms with 
unknown positions in subprime mortgages, the problems also spread to other markets through a 
flight to quality. Figure 6 shows the interest rates on 30-day U.S. Treasury bills and 30-day 
commercial paper. The commercial paper rates are AA rates for financial, non-financial and 
asset-backed commercial paper and for A2/P2/F2 commercial paper.
20 The rate on 30-day 
                                                 
17 Another common measure of stress in these markets is the TED spread, which is measured by 
LIBOR over Treasury rates. This spread is broadly similar to the LIBOR-OIS spread for this 
period.  
18 The method for determining LIBOR became controversial when it rose so dramatically, with 
some of the skepticism probably due to the rates being based on a survey rather than actual 
transactions. After study of the concern, the British Bankers Association and, we understand, the 
Financial Services Authority believe that the rates are representative as intended. 
19 In 2007 before August 9, the LIBOR-OIS spread averaged 6 basis points with a maximum 
spread of 12 basis points. 
20 A2/P2/F2 commercial paper is commercial paper issued by lower-rated, second-tier, firms as 
determined by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch respectively. Despite the series name, the 
data are not based on the F2 rating after June 18, 2007. On that date, the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System which provides the data announced that “On June 18, 2007, the 
Federal Reserve Board stopped using Fitch Investors Service as a credit rating source.   15
Treasury bills fell from 4.70 percent per year on August 9 to 2.47 percent on August 20. At the 
same time, rates on non-prime commercial paper rose 35 basis points on AA asset-backed 
commercial paper and 40 basis points on A2-P2 commercial paper. The rates on AA financial 
paper and non-financial paper changed relatively little over the same eleven days, falling 5 basis 
points and 7 basis points respectively. Before the markets opened on August 17, the Federal 
Reserve announced a surprise inter-meeting 50 basis point decrease in the Federal Funds rate.
21 
One measure of the distress that financial institutions were suffering, and the  risk their 
counterparties were facing, is the rate on credit default swaps (CDS) for selected banks shown in 
Figure 7.  These CDS spreads clearly show concerns about the solvency of the institutions, with 
local peaks appearing on August 16 for Washington Mutual and Countrywide, banks affiliated 
with firms heavily involved in making subprime loans and subject to the risk of delinquent 
subprime loans being put back to them.  
By November, more than 80 subprime lenders had closed their doors (Wall Street 
Journal, 2007). While options to put purchased mortgages back to the lender help to create 
incentive-compatible contracts under originate-to-distribute banking, these options lose their 
value if the lender closes its doors. 
As with BNP Paribas and Cheyne, the problems were not limited to the U.S. Two state-
owned banks in Germany ran into financial difficulties in July and August 2007 due to subprime 
investments (Reuter 2007). In addition, four small towns in northern Norway acquired positions 
in asset-backed commercial paper created by Citigroup (Berglund 2007). 
It is easy to characterize this as a problem entirely exported from the U.S. to the rest of 
the world. This claim fails on two facts. The rise in housing prices was world-wide and housing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Classification as AA or A2/P2 for rate calculations and classification as Tier-1 or Tier-2 for 
outstanding calculations are done using Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s.” 
(Board of Governors, 2007). 
21  This decrease is too small to explain all of the fall in the Treasury rate and, in any case, is not 
mirrored in the commercial paper rates.   16
prices subsequently fell in much of the world. Furthermore, borrowers in countries such as the 
U.K., Australia and Ireland were not financing their houses by obtaining subprime mortgages 
from U.S. lenders. In fact, it is worth noting that Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (tranched 
mortgage-backed securities similar to CDOs) originated in Europe, and CDOs were issued by 
originators of mortgages outside the U.S. Furthermore, the first financial institution in serious 
trouble was Northern Rock in the U.K. 
Northern Rock 
   Northern Rock had trouble with its overnight funding and could not determine how to 
fund an impending securitization of its own mortgages in the changed circumstances after 
August 9. Northern Rock began operation as a U.K. savings bank and became a joint-stock bank 
in 1997. After its demutualization, it continued its reliance on mortgage loans on the asset side of 
its balance sheet. It expanded its liabilities in no small part by overnight funding from other 
institutions, with a ratio of deposits to loans of 31 percent at the end of 2006. In addition, 
Northern Rock funded mortgages by securitization. Such an asset and liability structure is 
problematic: it runs counter to long-standing banking advice to not fund long-lived assets by 
deposits redeemable on demand; overnight funding is even more tenuous. 
A planned periodic securitization by Northern Rock in September 2007 was put in doubt 
by the turmoil in the market for mortgage-backed securities on August 9. (Milne and Wood 
2008; Congdon 2009).  It was evident that the “frozen” state of financial markets meant 
difficulties for Northern Rock, and the bank’s management immediately started to work with the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the U.K. to resolve the issue. Between August 10 and 
mid-September, Northern Rock and the Tripartite Commission (the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
the Chairman of the FSA and the Governor of the Bank of England) were in constant 
communication. The Tripartite Commission pursued three options not taken to resolve Northern 
Rock’s problems. These were for Northern Rock 1. to obtain funds from the money market or   17
securitize debt; 2. to be taken over by another bank; and 3. To receive funds from the Bank of 
England which would be guaranteed by the government. In the event, none of these options was 
taken. 
Instead, a support operation by the Bank of England without government guarantees was 
selected on September 10. On September 13, rumors of the operation spread and the outline of 
the program was aired on national news that evening. A run on deposits began that evening and 
continued on Friday, September 14 and Monday, September 17.
22 This run was perfectly 
understandable: deposit insurance in the U.K. did not fully guarantee deposits above two 
thousand pounds. On the following Monday at 5 p.m., the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced that deposits in Northern Rock were guaranteed in full. (Milne and Wood 2008). 
Some aspects of these developments are due to happenstance in addition to poor choices, 
but the end result was the general public’s increased sensitivity to the possibility of losses on 
deposits in financial institutions. This was true not only in the U.K.: images of lines of depositors 
withdrawing deposits were shown on television around the world. 
Government Investment Pools 
This run on Northern Rock was mirrored in concerns about government investment pools 
in the U.S. – including a run on at least one of them. Government investment pools are run by 
state governments with investments by various local governments located in the state. These 
pools otherwise are similar to money market mutual funds and sometimes are called “2-a7 like” 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2008).
23 The fund operated by the state of Florida is typical.
24 The Florida 
Local Government Surplus Funds Trust Fund Investment Pool invested in short-term assets and 
                                                 
22 Deposits were withdrawn over the phone, over the Internet and by regular mail. 
23 This is a set of SEC rules that have made it possible for money market mutual funds since their 
development to keep an unchanging net asset value. This is explained in more detail in the text 
below on the run on money market funds and in Dwyer and Samartin (2009). 
24 There were runs on funds in other states at the same time. (Karmin and Barr 2007). To the best 
of our knowledge, these runs did not result in closure of the funds or losses to participants.   18
maintained a stable redemption value of $1.00. On June 30, 2007, it held asset-backed 
commercial paper rated A-1/P-1 or better and other highly-rated investments with a total value of 
$25.5 billion (Florida State Board of Administration, 2007b). Some of the commercial paper was 
issued by structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that held mortgages. As of July 31, 2007, the 
Florida pool had investments in securities by 28 CDOs and SIVs. 
Local government finance officers around Florida were concerned and were receiving 
periodic updates on the portfolio. The Florida State Board of Administration issued an update on 
the fund’s financial position on November 10 (Florida State Board of Administration 2007a). 
Most of the issuers of paper had made good on the promised payments due to non-required 
payments by sponsors or by extending the paper’s maturity with coupon enhancement. Four of 
the issuers, however, did not make promised payments. On November 15, David Evans at 
Bloomberg wrote an article (Evans, 2007) in which he claimed: 
What ... municipal finance managers ... across the country still haven't been told – 
is that state-run pools have parked taxpayers' money in some of the most 
confusing, opaque and illiquid debt investments ever devised. These include so-
called structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, which are among the subprime 
mortgage debt-filled contrivances that have blown up at the biggest banks in the 
world. 
The hyperbole aside, a run on the Florida government investment pool ensued with 
governments across the state withdrawing funds (Huntley 2007). The funds invested fell about 8 
percent on November 18 and 20 percent on November 19. In November, pool deposits fell 46.7 
percent, dramatically greater than the largest prior monthly net outflow of 11.7 percent (Florida 
State Board of Administration 2008, p. 6). On November 29, the fund was closed to withdrawals. 
The state of Florida had no legal obligation to make up for losses on the assets held by 
the pool, and the governor announced during the run that the state would not do so. A later   19
accounting revealed that four investments accounting for 3.4 percent of the portfolio had 
weighted-average losses of 5 percent as of November 17. All but a small part – 1.27 percent – of 
even this paper was backed by prime and alt-A mortgages. The loss on the total portfolio before 
the run was 0.17 percent. 
This was small comfort to the remaining investors. After closure of the existing fund, 
distressed assets were put in a fund now called Fund B and other assets were used to start a new 
fund called Fund A. As of this writing, Fund B has not been wound down and has acquired some 
of the mortgage collateral behind the commercial paper held by the fund in early November, 
2007.
25 
Other Manifestations of Problems 
The turmoil was widespread and frequently appeared in what had been sleepy parts of 
financial markets and in arcane instruments known mostly to specialists. 
Monoline Insurance Companies 
So-called monoline insurance companies were involved in the securitization of 
mortgages. These companies’ long-term business had been insuring state and local governments’ 
debt. For example, an A-rated state could buy insurance from a AAA-rated monoline insurance 
company on the bonds and the bonds would be rated AAA. States and local governments bought 
such insurance when the premium was less than the difference in the rates on their bonds before 
and after the insurance. 
Monoline insurance companies became involved in selling insurance on CDOs and other 
structured products. As the value of the CDOs fell, a contingent liability for the insurance 
became more likely to result in a payment, and the monoline insurers’ ratings became more 
                                                 
 
25 Some Florida finance officers commented to Dwyer that larger cities and counties 
withdrew funds and the primary losers tended to be smaller governmental entities. A news report 
suggested that the Florida hurricane insurance fund also suffered losses (Evans 2007b).   20
dubious as the payouts increased relative to the insurers’ capital. In late 2007 and early 2008, the 
monoline insurers’ ratings were downgraded, which resulted in immediate downgrades of the 
insured municipal securities. By the end of 2008, differences in yields on insured and uninsured 
bonds were nil because the prices of insured securities had fallen, and consequently 
municipalities’ costs of issuing debt had increased. 
Auction Rate Securities Market 
The failure of the auction rate securities market was another consequence of the 
difficulties. Auction rate securities are securities issued for long terms but the rates reset in 
frequent auctions of the securities, commonly weekly or monthly. Issuing such debt can be 
advantageous to an issuer if the interest rate is similar to rates on short-term debt and the average 
cost of long-term debt is less than the average cost of short-term debt. These securities are issued 
by state and local governments and reportedly fund student loans in the U.S. as well. 
These auctions provide the holders of the security with the option of selling at par value 
on a regular basis at the auction. In September 2007, auctions began to fail. While the 
investment-bank sponsors of the securities typically would have become residual bidders, they 
did not do so in September 2007. As a consequence, holders of these securities found themselves 
stuck holding illiquid claims on the issuers instead of holding cash-equivalent securities that paid 
interest marginally more than similar highly liquid instruments.
26 
Auction failures dealt another blow to municipalities, the primary issuers of auction rate 
securities. While the contracts were idiosyncratic, most auction rate securities provided for a 
“penalty” interest rate to be paid to investors if an auction were to fail – a form of ex post 
illiquidity premium. Municipalities, such as the Port Authority of New York, saw their weekly 
interest rate expenses climb to rates over 20 percent per year. Not surprisingly, most such issuers 
                                                 
26  Subsequently, several auction rate security sponsors did purchase the illiquid securities from 
their customers.   21
refinanced their existing auction rate debt into more traditional longer term municipal bond 
issues. 
Episodic Development of Stress 
There is some reason to expect a certain amount of seasonality to the stress in inter-bank 
lending markets if one of the underlying issues is opacity related to the sizes of portfolio losses 
for various banks. As the time comes to reveal quarterly earnings with mark-to-market valuation 
of assets, information is likely to leak about losses and lenders are likely to be more concerned at 
this time about having loans on their balance sheets to institutions that have difficulties. 
Figure 5 shows some loose, suggestive evidence of seasonality of the stress in the LIBOR 
market on a quarterly basis. Figure 5 has the local peaks tabulated in Table 1.  While the peaks in 
September 2007, December 2007 and March 2008 are three months apart, the peak a month later 
in April 2008 and the relative stability for the next six months are not especially consistent with 
this proposition. While the facts probably could be made to fit the proposition, that does not 
seem like a particularly appealing strategy to us. We tentatively conclude that the episodic 
financial stress was not primarily seasonal due to the resolution of balance sheet uncertainty. 
 
The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds in the Crisis of Fall 2008 
The announcement of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 set off a chain 
of events which led to a true “crisis” in global financial markets (Schwartz 1986).  This section 
details the role played by money market mutual funds in these unfolding events and the specific 
policy responses by the US and foreign central banks.  Prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, 
speculation regarding the consequences of a failure of a systemically important financial 
institution focused on the complexity and far-reaching nature of the institution’s network of 
counterparties. Perhaps the largest direct effect of the Lehman bankruptcy was due, however, to 
the effect the bankruptcy announcement had on a single counterparty, the Reserve Primary Fund,   22
which held Lehman’s outstanding short-term paper. Reserve Primary Fund was not particularly 
important in its own right but, as we argue in this section, the actions of its management and 
investors threatened to trigger a run on the entire money market mutual fund industry. While a 
run on money market mutual funds as a whole did not materialize, the response of individual 
funds to the threat affected access to short term funding for both financial and non-financial 
firms. 
Background on Money Market Mutual Funds 
Money market mutual funds are open end mutual funds organized under Rule 2a-7 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.  This rule allows money market mutual funds, in contrast to 
other types of open end mutual funds, to maintain a stable daily net asset value of $1 per share by 
using amortized cost valuation or penny-rounding pricing. This stable pricing makes money 
market mutual funds a close substitute for other cash management products such as demand 
deposits at banks and is important for the demand for these products by both retail and 
institutional investors.
27 In order to make use of the stable price exemption, money market 
mutual fund portfolios are restricted to: 1) maintain a dollar-weighted average maturity of 90 
days or less and hold no securities with a maturity of greater than 397 days; 2) hold 95 percent or 
more of their assets in securities which are rated in the two highest short term rating categories 
by two NRSROs; and 3) hold less than 5 percent of the portfolio assets in securities of any one 
issuer.
28  Finally, any money market mutual fund whose name suggests that it holds a portfolio 
                                                 
27 As of December 2008, households held 75 percent of their total $7.7trillion of cash products 
within the banking system. In contrast, institutional investors held 40 percent of  their $5.2trillion 
in money market mutual funds, 40 percent in the banking system and the remaining 20 percent in 
cash pools and offshore money funds. See Report of the Money Market Working Group, ICI, 
3/17/2009. The greater usage of bank deposits by individual investors may be due to the FDIC 
insurance on these products. Money market funds have no such guarantee.   
28 This description is a simplified version of full requirements under Rule 2a-7. For example, 
there are exceptions to the 397 day maturity restriction for certain adjustable rate government 
securities and variable and floating rate securities and exceptions to the concentration of issuer 
restriction for funds that invest in the municipal securities issued by entities of a single state.     23
of US government securities faces the further restriction that it must hold at least 80 percent of 
its assets in U.S. government securities. 
                                                
To meet these requirements, taxable fund managers typically hold a variety of 
instruments including U.S. Treasury bills, bank CDs and notes, cash, short term corporate notes, 
Eurodollars, repo transactions and commercial paper. On average, taxable general purpose (i.e., 
non-Treasury) fund managers hold approximately 32 percent of their portfolios in commercial 
paper and these holdings account for a reported 40 percent of the commercial paper outstanding 
as of summer 2008. Except for U.S. Treasury securities, these holdings of commercial paper are 
the funds’ most liquid assets should funds want cash for redemptions. 
The Lehman Bankruptcy and the Reserve Primary Fund 
The Reserve Primary Fund was a taxable general purpose money market mutual fund offered 
by the Reserve Funds advisory complex. On September 16, 2008, in the wake of the Lehman 
bankruptcy, the Reserve Primary Fund became the first retail money market fund to “break the 
buck” when the net asset value of its shares fell to $0.97.
29 Ironically, Reserve Funds had been 
the innovator in the industry, introducing the first retail money market mutual fund in 1971. 
Once again, actions by Reserve Fund managers would have far reaching implications for both 
the money market fund industry and funding markets worldwide.  
The connection between Lehman’s bankruptcy and Reserve Primary Fund’s breaking the 
buck was the $785 million of Lehman commercial paper and medium-term notes held by the 
Reserve Primary Fund on September 15, 2008.  These holdings were part of a broader change in 
the fund’s portfolio strategy begun in the middle of 2007 in which holdings of commercial paper 
 
29 In September 1994, an institutional government fund offered by Community Bankers Mutual 
Fund, Inc. broke the buck due to large holdings of adjustable rate securities.  This, first ever, 
instance of breaking the buck did not set off a similar chain of events to what will be described 
here regarding the Reserve Primary Fund. This was likely largely due to the relatively smaller 
use of money market funds by institutions at that time.   24
went from 1 percent in June 2007 to over 50 percent by the end of December. 
30 When Lehman 
declared bankruptcy, Reserve Primary Fund marked its commercial paper holdings to zero. This 
loss in value, along with significant redemptions by institutional investors, roughly 37 percent of 
the fund’s net assets on September 15 alone, reduced the fund’s net asset value to $0.97, thereby 
imposing a 3 percent loss on investors remaining in the fund. Not surprisingly, the redemption 
requests escalated and by September 17 amounted to 90 percent of the fund’s total assets at the 
start of the run. On September 22 the SEC granted the fund the power to suspend redemptions 
and postpone payment of redemption proceeds for longer than the allowed regulatory period of 
seven days.  
This run on the Reserve Primary Fund threatened to spill over and trigger a run on the entire 
mutual fund industry.  While no other money market funds broke the buck, redemption pressure 
was widely felt and, perhaps even more important, feared.
31 In the week ending September 17, 
investors, predominantly institutions, withdrew $169 billion from money market funds, 5 percent 
of total industry assets. Moreover, there was a substantial flight to quality. While $240 billion of 
industry assets were withdrawn from general purpose funds during that week and another $156 
billion the following week, Treasury funds experienced inflows of $242 billion.
32 Figure 8 
illustrates the dramatic change in the composition of industry assets. 
As a result, general purpose money market funds attempted to both fund redemptions and 
increase liquidity in order to hedge against the possibility of yet more redemptions. The strategy 
of fund managers as a whole was to shorten the maturity of their portfolios, sell off liquid assets 
such as commercial paper, and reduce credit risk by tightening standards on commercial paper 
                                                 
30 The details here come from a thorough and interesting look at the recent management of the 
Reserve Primary Fund in  the Report of the Money Market Working Group, ICI, March 17, 
2009.  
31 According to Crane Data, Inc., as of October 29, 2008, 25 fund advisors had officially 
disclosed capital support agreements to protect the $1 share price of their money market mutual 
funds due to direct and indirect exposure to the Lehman bankruptcy. 
32 This is based on ICI Weekly Money Market data.   25
and shifting assets to U.S. Treasuries.
33 Commercial paper of financial institutions was of 
particular concern. 
The failure of Lehman and the bridge loan to AIG later the same week left all market 
participants, not just money market fund managers, with high uncertainty about government 
policy and the likely fates of other large financial institutions. Anecdotal evidence indicates that 
there was particular concern regarding Wachovia’s commercial paper, widely held by money 
market funds, would be treated by the FDIC if Wachovia were to fail. 
Not surprisingly, given the economic importance of money market funds in the 
commercial paper market and similar concerns by other holders of the paper, spreads on 
commercial paper products widened quickly and dramatically, as Figure 6 shows. At the same 
time, Figure 9 shows that the maturity structure of outstanding commercial paper shortened 
noticeably. While roughly 65 to 70 percent of commercial paper issuance had been in the 1-4 day 
maturity range, this percentage spiked to over 80 percent in late September and issuance of 80+ 
day paper fell from 5 to 10 percent to less than 1 percent. Significant tiering is visible in the 
response of commercial paper spreads during this time as well. Non-top tier A2/P2 paper rates 
increased by 300bps, followed by asset-backed paper with increases of 250bps and AA financial 
paper rates increasing 100bps. In addition, there is anecdotal information that firm-specific 
tiering of risk premia also took place. 
  Money market funds earlier had been affected by the onset of the financial turmoil in late 
2007.
34 As Figure 6 shows, rates on 30-day commercial asset-backed paper increased 
dramatically in August 2007 and then again around the turn of the year. The first episode was 
                                                 
33 ICI data indicate that commercial paper holdings by taxable money market funds declined 
$151 billion in September and the average maturity declined from 48 days to 41 days.  
34 The increase in commercial paper rates later in the year likely reflected concerns about 
funding over the turn of the year. Recall that this was also the time that the Federal Reserve 
announced the introduction of the Term Auction Facility to extend term funding to institutions 
eligible for primary credit (i.e. depository institutions). Money market funds experienced no 
discernible pressures during this time.    26
directly related to the subprime market due to the prevalence of asset-backed commercial paper 
funding of SIVs holding subprime RMBS. Credit concerns had prompted many money fund 
managers to reduce or eliminate holdings of asset-backed commercial paper. This development 
had no significant effect on the issuance of longer term commercial paper or commercial paper 
rates of high-grade financial and non-financial firms. At least 20 advisory firms did step in with 
capital support agreements to protect the $1 share price of their funds during this period.
35  
  The effects of stress on money market mutual funds were not limited to the United States. 
As of mid-2008, the fifteen largest general purpose money market funds, which account for 40 
percent of total general purpose fund assets, held an average of 22 percent of their commercial 
paper holdings in paper issued by European banks (Baba, McCauley and Ramaswamy 2009). 
Fund investments in bank CDs, bank notes and repo transactions were even more heavily 
invested in Europe; the percentages were 78 percent, 33 percent and 51 percent  respectively. By 
the end of November, these same 15 funds still had half of their investments in non-US banks 
while their total assets had fallen by 14 percent. In 2008, European banks received approximately 
$1 trillion from U.S. money market mutual funds, which was about one-eighth of their total 
dollar funding. The response of U.S. money market fund managers detailed above created a large 
demand for dollar funding by European banks and contributed to the dramatic spike in LIBOR 
rates during this period (Baba, McCauley and Ramaswamy 2009). 
Policy Responses – A Run Averted 
Several policy actions on the part of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury averted a 
run on the money market industry.  The most direct action to stem the run was the Treasury’s 
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Mutual funds. This program was created on 
September 19, 2008 using Presidentially-authorized funding from the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund. Under the terms of the program, all investments in participating 2a-7 money market 
                                                 
35 This is documented by the news archives on Cranedata.com for April 2008.   27
mutual funds as of the close on September 19
 were guaranteed a redemption value of $1 per 
share. By eliminating the rational incentive on the part of investors to be the first in line to 
withdraw funds, this program likely disrupted the dynamics of a larger-scale run.
36 Given the 
liquidity problems in the markets, however, investors could not be sure of their ability to redeem 
and receive their assets in a timely manner. This residual risk, which likely loomed larger for 
institutions than for individual investors, was addressed by policy actions taken in the following 
weeks.
37  
  To aid money market mutual funds in managing their liquidity demands and to address 
the consequent disruption in the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve Board created 
three credit facilities: 1. The Asset Backed Money Market Liquidity Facility (AMLF); 2. The 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and 3. The Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIFF). The AMLF allows banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve at the primary credit 
rate in order to purchase high-grade asset-backed commercial paper from money market funds.
38 
The MMIFF is a facility into which money market funds can sell bank CDs and notes and high-
grade commercial paper issued by 50 different financial institutions. The CPFF directly targets 
the commercial paper market by providing a facility into which commercial paper issuers can 
sell new issues of 3 month paper at penalty rates.
39 
  As Figure 10 shows, the AMLF was introduced early in the crisis period and immediately 
attracted nearly $150 billion in loans (roughly the amount of pull back by the money market 
funds).  Participation in the AMLF trailed off in the remaining months of the year. Market 
                                                 
36 However, the amount of funding available in the Exchange Stabilization Fund was not enough 
to fully guarantee the $1.9 trillion of investor assets in all general purpose funds.  
37 Consistent with this conjecture, ICI data indicates that individual investors exhibited a flight to 
quality that was much smaller in terms of total asset values and much slower than that displayed 
by institutional investors.  
38 The “primary credit rate” is more popularly known by its former name of “discount rate”. 
39 For example, asset backed commercial paper can be issued into the CPFF at the overnight 
indexed swap rate plus 300 basis points.   28
participants report that this is due to the passing of the spike in redemption concerns, but the 
facility still was viewed as an important source of insurance should the industry experience 
another episode of stress. The CPFF was brought on line slightly later; it was announced on 
October 7 and became operational on October 27. Given the spreads on commercial paper and 
the anecdotal evidence of difficulties issuing paper, the CPFF attracted $225 billion in its first 
two weeks of operation and accounted for 75 to 80 percent of the 81+day issuance.  The CPFF 
later contracted: only half of this initial paper was rolled over inside the CPFF when the paper 
matured in late January 2009. The MMIFF has not yet been used by money market funds.
40 
  The AMLF and the CPFF appear to have been successful in averting a run on money 
market funds and providing a liquid secondary market to keep the longer term 81+Day 
commercial paper funding markets accessible.  The effect of the CPFF in particular can be seen 
in the earlier chart showing the maturity structure of commercial paper issuance. The large 
increase in the percentage of 81+Day paper and the large decrease in the percentage of 1-4 day 
paper in October 2008 and late January 2009 reflect usage of the CPFF. In addition, private 
market rates on 3-month commercial paper decreased below the CPFF penalty rates.
41 Moreover, 
privately placed paper extended its average maturity. For example, 55 percent of 81+Day paper 
issuance went to the private market in January 2009. 
                                                 
40 This may be partly because the facility did not come online until November 24, well after 
liquidity pressure subsided. Industry members also report, however, that the lack of participation 
is due to an unwillingness to take on the credit-risk exposure inherent in the structure of the 
MMIFF.  While money market funds can sell instruments into the MMIFF, they receive only 90 
percent of their value, with the additional 10 percent made up of asset-backed commercial paper 
issued by the MMIFF to the participating money market fund. This implies that funds would 
retain some credit-risk exposure to other financial institutions in addition to the financial 
institution backing the instruments which they sold into the MMIFF. 
The MMIFF has 5 SPVs, each allowed to purchase instruments issued by 10 designated 
financial institutions. Through the equity-financed ABCP portion of the payment, money funds 
are exposed to the credit risk of, potentially, all 10 institutions in the SPV in which it 
participates.  
41 This probably reflects some selection effects, with higher quality issuers issuing paper into the 
private market and lower quality issuers using the CPFF.   29
To address the demand for dollar funding by European banks during this time, the Federal 
Reserve greatly expanded its swap lines with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National 
Bank and instituted a swap line with the Bank of England. On October 13, 2008 the possible 
sizes of these swap lines became unlimited after the Federal Reserve announced that “sizes of the 
reciprocal currency arrangements … will be increased to accommodate whatever quantity of 
U.S. dollar funding is demanded.” Baba, McCauley and Ramaswamy (2009) estimate that the 
swap lines fully met the additional demand for U.S. dollar funding created by the pull-back in 
funding from money market mutual funds.
42 
 
The Evolution of Policy Responses 
Just as the financial turmoil evolved and spread, so too did the response of various 
policymakers.  
Initial responses of the Federal Reserve to the financial turmoil were predominantly 
everyday policy actions. Prior to the failure of Bear Sterns, the FOMC reduced the Federal Funds 
target by 225 basis points and took only one unusual action, the creation of the Term Auction 
Facility (TAF) in December 2007. The TAF extended the term of Federal Reserve loans but not 
the institutions eligible to receive them. The TAF auctions initially were consistently 
oversubscribed and continued to be oversubscribed through the summer of 2008.
43 
March 2008 brought the first instance of the potential failure in the U.S. of a firm judged 
to be systemically important, Bear Stearns. For the first time since the 1930s, the Federal 
Reserve invoked authority under Section 13(3) to make secured loans to “individuals, 
partnerships, and corporations” to create the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) which could 
                                                 
42 BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009, “US Dollar Money Market Funds and Non-US Banks”. 
43 In the Fall of 2008, longer term TAF loans were initiated and the amount up for loan at each 
auction was expanded.   30
extend loans directly to the 16 Primary Dealers.
44 From this point forward, Federal Reserve 
policy began targeting what now appear to be the drivers of the turmoil: opacity, illiquidity of 
certain assets, counterparty risk and uncertainty.  
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was a first step in targeting the drivers of 
the turmoil. In March 2008, the Fed announced the TSLF in which the Federal Reserve engages 
in term asset swaps, lending out liquid Treasury securities in return for collateral that may be low 
risk but illiquid. Acceptable Schedule 2 collateral in the TSLF includes investment grade 
mortgage-backed and asset backed securities. Initially, the facility seemed designed to buy time 
until these collateral assets regained liquidity. Institutions could roll over their swapped 
positions, use the Treasuries for collateral in their other activities and wait out the turmoil. The 
continued use of the TSLF throughout the Summer and Fall of 2008 is consistent with the 
continuing lack of resolution of broader concerns about counterparty risk and opacity related to 
bank balance sheets. Liquidity of various securities certainly contributed to the turmoil, but 
breathing room gained by swapping these assets for Treasury securities was not enough to bring 
stability to financial markets. 
The period of crisis following the Lehman bankruptcy initiated a new era in Federal 
Reserve policy – a series of actions using 13(3) authority to support the funding and liquidity of 
the money market mutual fund industry and the commercial paper market. These policies deviate 
from traditional monetary policy by targeting particular financial markets. During this time, 
concern mounted about a spillover from “Wall Street to Main Street” with distress in financial 
markets and institutions reducing consumer and business credit. 
The underlying cause of the financial turmoil – the doubtful condition of financial 
institutions due to their ownership of difficult-to-value heterogeneous assets and the counterparty 
                                                 
44  These firms are ‘primary dealers’ in the U.S. Treasury market and have extensive transactions 
with the Federal Reserve through the Open Markets Committee Trading Desk. At the time of its 
inception there were 20 Primary Dealer Firms.    31
risk that follows from it – had not resolved itself.  Banks had not completely written down the 
losses on its subprime mortgage-backed securities and related exposures. To be sure, stock prices 
implied estimates of these losses and the supply of funding to some institutions fell. It seemed 
increasingly clear that the crisis would subside only once losses on financial institutions’ assets 
were realized and solvent institutions were sorted out from the insolvent ones.    
During the peak of the crisis in September 2008, Secretary Paulson requested and 
obtained approval from Congress to fund a $700 billion Treasury-run Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP). The initial plan to purchase problematic subprime-mortgage-backed securities 
became a capital injection program. The troubled assets were to be left with the banking system, 
but banks would be recapitalized using government funds. This set off a rush by nonbank 
financial institutions to become bank holding companies. 
The $700 billion of TARP funds was nearly all allocated eventually, but as of this writing 
in July 2009, the banking system appears to be little closer to realizing its losses and 
restructuring. In Spring 2009, the Treasury introduced stress tests to measure the financial 
condition of the largest banks and announced a plan with public-private partnerships purchasing 
troubled assets held by banks. Possibly this plan could get to the heart of the issues of opacity 
and the reduction of counterparty risk. But unfortunately, the turmoil has a new driver: policy 
risk. 
Policy risk can be defined as risk related to various policy actions that might be taken in 
the future or the potential repudiation of past policy decisions. There are many dimensions of 
policy risk in the current environment including, but not limited to, 
1)  How will losses be allocated between the government and the private sector? 
Though the broad outlines of a public private partnership have been announced, 
the details of the plan will determine if it is likely to be successful in getting   32
banks to sell their assets and private investors to contribute capital. Thus, this 
policy is still far from clear. 
2)  How will winners be treated? In the wake of recent Congressional hearings and 
proposed legislation related to the AIG bonus payments, the uncertainty over 
whether profits made by private investors will be clawed back remains large. 
3)  Will there be authority granted to resolve bank holding companies? To whom? 
How will those resolution decisions be made? Is nationalization a possibility? 
The presence of policy risk contributes to the continuation of the financial turmoil as 
institutions take actions conditional on their changing assessment of future policy. 
Hypothetically, a clear and credible statement of policy regarding, say, the resolution of 
insolvent banks, or even their nationalization, could help to resolve uncertainty, set the “rules of 
the game” and motivate institutions and investors to commit to their own strategies in response. 
Whether such a policy statement would be credible is not obvious and without credibility, policy 
risk remains. The more direction that policymakers can give to private agents regarding the menu 
of future policy actions, the framework in which policy decisions will be made, and the 
commitment of policymakers to honor past actions, the better. When in a situation characterized 
by uncertainty, even a bounding of possible outcomes represents a marked improvement. 
 
Conclusion 
The drivers of the financial turmoil and the Financial Crisis of 2008 were heterogeneous 
securities that were hard to value. These securities created concerns about counterparty risk and 
ultimately created substantial uncertainty. The problems spread in ways that were hard to see in 
advance. 
No doubt, with enough hindsight, the financial crisis could have been avoided. It is not 
apparent to us that foresight – other than perfect foresight – would have been sufficient to avoid   33
the crisis. Empirical models to forecast financial crises do well in sample but are much less 
helpful out of sample. 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 raises enough analytical and empirical issues to keep 
interested economists busy for the foreseeable future. 
The big policy issue going forward is the responses to the crisis. A desire for financial 
stability easily can lead to over-regulation and a moribund financial sector that bears more 
similarities to a graveyard than a vibrant, growing economy. 
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Local Peaks of the Libor-OIS Spread 
 
Date  Spread in basis points 
September 18, 2007  94.98 
December 4, 2007  109.89 
March 14, 2008  64.60 
April 21, 2008  85.00 
October 10, 2008  337.75 
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Appendix Table 1 
Market Events 
February 2007 – March 2009 
Event Date 
Ownit files Chapter 11  January 3, 2007 
MLN files Chapter 11  February 5, 2007 
HSBC announces deterioration of mortgage services operation  February 7, 2007 
ResMae files Chapter 11  February 13, 2007 
Freddie Mac no longer purchases most risky subprime MBS  February 27, 2007 
People’s Choice files Chapter 11  March 20, 2007 
New Century Financial files Chapter 11  April 2, 2007 
South Star files Chapter 7  April 12, 2007 
Bear Stearns suspends redemptions from Structured Finance Hedge Fund  June 7, 2007 
S&P places 612 subprime MBSs on credit watch  July 11, 2007 
Alliance files Chapter 7  July 16, 2007 
Bear Stearns liquidates MBSs hedge funds  July 31, 2007 
German government takes over KfW  August 3, 2007 
American Home Mortgage files Chapter 11  August 7, 2007 
BNP Paribas halts redemptions on 3 investment funds  August 9, 2007 
Failed auctions for auction-rate securities  September 2007-April 2008 
Run on Northern Rock  September 2007 
Citi, BofA, JPMorgan announce $80 billion Master Conduit plans  October 15, 2007 
Run on Florida local government investment pool  November 2007 
BofA announces purchase of Countrywide  January 11, 2008 
Rating agencies downgrade monoline insurers  January 18, 2008-April 2008 
JPMorgan takes over Bear Stearns  March 14, 2008 
IndyMac closed by OTS  July 11, 2008 
Fannie and Freddie put into conservatorship  September 7, 2008 
BofA announces purchase of Merrill Lynch  September 15, 2008 
Lehman files for Chapter 11  September 15, 2008 
AIG given $85 billion bridge loan by Fed   September 16, 2008   38
Reserve Primary Fund breaks the buck  September 16, 2008 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become BHCs  September 21, 2008 
WaMu closed by OTS  September 25, 2008 
FDIC closes 33 banks  October 2008-March 2009 
Wells Fargo acquires Wachovia  October 12, 2008 
PNC purchases National City  October 24, 2008 
Amex and AmexTravel become BHCs  November 10, 2008 
Lincoln National, Hartford & Genworth make acquisitions to get access to TARP  November 17, 2008 
CIT Group becomes BHC  December 22, 2008 
GMAC and IBFHC become BHCs  December 24, 2008 
FHLB Seattle and San Francisco suspend dividend  January 8, 2009 
Banks begin returning TARP funds  March 2009 
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Appendix Table 2 
Policy Events 
August 2007 – March 2009 
Event Date 
Fed reduces discount rate by 50 bps  August 17, 2007 
Fed reduces Federal Funds (FF) target by 50 bps  September 18, 2007 
Fed reduces FF target by 25 bps  October 31, 2007 
Fed reduces FF target by 25 bps  December 11, 2007 
Intermeeting: Fed reduces FF target by 75 bps  January 22, 2008 
Fed reduces FF target by 50 bps  January 30, 2008 
Fed announces TAF and swaplines with ECB and SNB  February 4, 2008 
Fed announces TSLF and Term Repo  March 11, 2008 
Fed facilitates acquisition of Bear Stearns  March 14, 2008 
Fed announces PDCF and reduces penalty rate by 25 bps  March 16, 2008 
Fed reduces FF target by 75 bps  March 18, 2008 
Fed reduces FF target by 25 bps  April 30, 2008 
Fed expands TSLF collateral, swaplines and TAF auctions  May 2, 2008 
Fed and Treasury announce lending and equity support for GSEs  July 13, 2008 
SEC temporarily halts short sales on GSEs and primary dealers  July 15, 2008 
Housing & Economic Recovery Act  July 30, 2008 
GSEs enter conservatorship  September 7, 2008 
Fed expands collateral in TSLF and PDCF, issues 23A exemptions  September 14, 2008 
Lehman Bankruptcy  September 15, 2008 
Fed provides $85 billion loan to AIG  September 16, 2008 
SEC bans shortselling in all financial firms  September 17, 2008 
Swap lines expand to $620 billion  September 18, 2008-October 29, 2008 
Fed creates AMLF  September 19, 2008 
Treasury announces MMMF guarantee  September 19, 2008 
TARP proposal in Congress  September 20, 2008-October 3, 2008 
Fed announces IOR policy  October 6, 2008 
Fed announces CPFF  October 7, 2008   40
Fed increases deposit insurance  October 7, 2008 
Fed reduces FF target by 50 bps  October 8, 2008 
TARP Capital Injections, 200+ Banks  October 14, 2008-March, 2009 
FDIC creates TLGP debt guarantee program  October 14, 2008 
Fed announces MMIFF  October 21, 2008 
Fed reduces FF target by 50 bps  October 29, 2008 
GSEs suspend foreclosures  November 20, 2008 
Treasury, Fed, and FDIC announce funding for CITI, BofA  November 23, 2008 
Fed announces TALF  November 25, 2008 
Fed announces purchases of GSE debt and MBS  November 25, 2008 
Fed moves to FF rate to 0-25bps range  December 16, 2008 
Treasury authorizes loans to GM and Chrysler from TARP  December 19, 2008 
Treasury announces Financial Stability Plan  February 10, 2009 
U.S. Stimulus Plan  February 17, 2009 
TALF implemented  March 19, 2009 
FOMC begins Treasury purchases  March 31, 2009 
SE/FASB Changes to Fair Value Accounting  March 31, 2009 
  
 


















Figure 1. Housing Price Indices
January 2000 through April 2009
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Figure 3. U.S. Mortgage Originations by Type
2001 through 2007
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Figure 4. ABX Indices by Vintage
06-1 vintage






























































Figure 5. LIBOR less OIS Spread - 30 Days
















Figure 6. 30 Day Commercial Paper and Treasury Rates
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Figure 8. Total Net Assets in Taxable Money Market Funds
September 2008 through June 2009
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Figure 10. AMLF and CPFF Loans
September 2008 through June 2009
AMLF
CPFF